History of Gain-of-Functon Research on SARS viruses

2002

Outbreak of SARS (today called SARS-CoV-1)

Sources

2006

Incorporation of a furin cleavage site into the spike protein of SARS-CoV-1. (University of Montana, USA). A furin cleavage site is also present in SARS-CoV-2. It is now proven that this enables the virus to penetrate host cells particularly efficiently. A furin cleavage site is extremely unusual in this virus group (sarbecoviruses of the β-coronaviruses).

2008

Creation of Spike protein chimeras: Spike sequences of SARS-CoV-1 were transferred into other SARS viruses (Wuhan Institute for Virology, China).

2013

Collection of SARS viruses from bat caves in China: SARS viruses that can bind to the human ACE2 receptor were sought (collaboration of EcoHealthAlliance, USA, Wuhan Institute for Virology, China, and others).

2014

Initiation of a moratorium against gain-of-function research in the U.S. under Obama due to growing risk concerns (from October 2014 to December 2017). During this period, SARS virus research previously conducted in the U.S. was then outsourced to China, but continued to be co-funded by U.S. scientists with public money. After the moratorium ended, GoF research on SARS viruses could again be conducted in the United States.

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2015

Novel spike protein chimeras: Spike sequences of SARS viruses from wild bats were incorporated into SARS viruses already adapted to mice in the laboratory. (Collaboration of University of North Carolina, USA, Wuhan Institute for Virology, China, and others).

The authors were aware of the dangers of their research and wrote in their article that from now on the risk had to be weighed against the benefit: “On the basis of these findings, scientific review panels may deem similar studies building chimeric viruses based on circulating strains too risky to pursue, as increased pathogenicity in mammalian models cannot be excluded. Together, these data and restrictions represent a crossroads of GOF research concerns; the potential to prepare for and mitigate future outbreaks must be weighed against the risk of creating more dangerous pathogens.”

The experiments in this research are among the most crucial and risky frontier crossings in gain-of-function research. The journal in which the article appeared then felt compelled at the onset of the pandemic, due to increasing criticism of GoF research, to add a commentary claiming that there was no evidence that SARS-CoV-2 originated in the laboratory and that natural emergence of the virus was most likely. However, both statements are no longer tenable today due to many new findings:

30 March 2020 Editors’ note, March 2020: “We are aware that this article is being used as the basis for unverified theories that the novel coronavirus causing COVID-19 was engineered. There is no evidence that this is true; scientists believe that an animal is the most likely source of the coronavirus.”

2016

Transgenic laboratory mice with human ACE2 receptor: The gene sequence of the human ACE2 receptor was inserted into laboratory mice so that these mice can also produce the human receptor. These animals were infected with chimeric SARS viruses whose binding efficiency to the human ACE2 receptor was genetically optimized.

Although this research was high-risk and caused a new potential risk, no statement on the risks of GoF research was published this time either by the authors, some of whom were the same as in the aforementioned study, or by the publishing journal.

More funding for SARS research in Wuhan. Following a joint research proposal to the NIH (National Institute for Health, USA), EcoHealthAlliance (USA) and the Wuhan Virus Laboratory (Wuhan Institute for Virology, China) will receive funding for research on the spike protein of SARS viruses. This research will also be conducted “in vivo,” i.e., on live laboratory animals, using viruses that have genetically engineered and optimized spike sequences.

Another application by the same scientists to DARPA in the U.S. (Department of Defense, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), which included further manipulation of SARS viruses, was rejected in 2018.

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SARS-like WIV1-CoV poised for human emergence | PNAS

(doi/10.1073/pnas.1517719113)

 

RePORTER (nih.gov)
(Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence)

2018/2019

In Wuhan, transgenic mice carrying the human ACE2 receptor were infected with different SARS variants. This was explained by the head of SARS virus research in Wuhan in 2020 in an interview with the renowned scientific journal “Science”.

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Mai 2021

A group of scientists from Bern, Bochum, Berlin (including Prof. Drosten) and Moscow published a method to produce genetically modified SARS-CoV-2 viruses within one week in the laboratory – for research purposes. The aim is to reproduce the evolution of SARS-CoV-2 in the laboratory and to generate the corresponding virus variants in the laboratory.

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What happend between SARS-CoV-1 (2002) and SARS-CoV-2 (2019) in the Wuhan Institute for Virology:

  • Masses of bats and coronaviruses were collected and taken to laboratories in Wuhan
  • Parts of the spike RNA of SARS were exchanged for spike RNA of other Coronaviruses (chimera, recombination).
  • Non-natural sequences were inserted into the RNA
  • A polybasic cleavage site (furin cleavage site) was inserted into SARS between the spike protein subunits S1 and S2.
  • Genetically engineered laboratory mice (human ACE2 receptor) were infected with a SARS strain from the Wuhan Institute for Virology.

The Research since the outbreak of sars-cov-2:


There has been a massive increase in funding and expansion of research on coronaviruses worldwide since 2020, particularly SARS-CoV-2. Many laboratories are working with live viruses that have full infectious potential.

 

"It is evident that swarms of academic researchers with little prior experience with coronaviruses have leapt into the field in recent months."
Edward Hammond
Sunshine Project, NGO observing the US Biodefense programm